The present studies assessed-the effect of intervening items on the accuracy of recognition memory for pictures and sentences. Subjects were presented a sequence of 24 pictures and sentences, later followed by the presentation of 24 intervening items. Each intervening item corresponded to, but was in the opposite modality from, one of the original items. These intervening items were either semantically relevant or irrelevant to the corresponding originals. Subjects then received a "same-different" recognition test that included original and changed items. Despite the difference in modality, the presence of a semantically relevant intervening item depressed the obtained values of d' and the probability of a hit, relative to the effects of an irrelevant intervening item. The data are discussed in terms of support for the integration property of constructive memory. The interpretation is that subjects semantically integrated the original items with the relevant intervening items and made subsequent recognition responses on the basis of the integrated memory.
The present studies assessed-the effect of intervening items on the accuracy of recognition memory for pictures and sentences. Subjects were presented a sequence of 24 pictures and sentences, later followed by the presentation of 24 intervening items. Each intervening item corresponded to, but was in the opposite modality from, one of the original items. These intervening items were either semantically relevant or irrelevant to the corresponding originals. Subjects then received a "same-different" recognition test that included original and changed items. Despite the difference in modality, the presence of a semantically relevant intervening item depressed the obtained values of d' and the probability of a hit, relative to the effects of an irrelevant intervening item. The data are discussed in terms of support for the integration property of constructive memory. The interpretation is that subjects semantically integrated the original items with the relevant intervening items and made subsequent recognition responses on the basis of the integrated memory.
A number of studies have demonstrated subjects' impressive ability to recognize pictorial material (Nickerson, 1965; Shepard, 1967; Standing, Conezio, & Haber, 1970) and recall it (Bousfield, Esterson, & Whitmarsh, 1957) . The question of what is stored in memory when a picture is remembered is, however, still unanswered. The evidence that picture memory is superior to memory for words (Paivio, Rogers, & Smythe, 1968) and sentences (Shepard, 1967) might suggest that pictures are stored in memory in a qualitatively different and separate way from verbal materials.
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Reprint requests and correspondence concerning this research should be sent to Kathy Pezdek, Department of Psychology, California State College, San Bernardino, California 92407. the picture is stored in a common pool of semantic information to which both pictorial and verbal materials contribute. Nelson and Reed (1976) have provided evidence that the semantic content of pictures and words is stored comparably, independent of the nature of the original representation. In addition, their findings suggest that the picture-superiority effect is due to superior encoding of pictures rather than to differences in the meaning representations in memory.
If this modality-free memory model is an accurate representation of the relationship between picture and verbal memory, then semantically related information, which is presented partially in the pictorial modality and partially in the verbal modality, should be integrated in memory. What is remembered then would be a combination of the information from both stores (with some memory tags for the modality of the original input). In a more general sense, this view suggests that people construct representations of experiences based on the integration of all available information, regardless of the modality in which the information was initially presented.
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The hypothesis that integration of semantically related verbal materials occurs has been supported by Bransford and Franks (1971) , Honeck (1973) , and with children, by Barclay and Reid (1974) . Similarly, within the visual mode, recall for pictorial materials has been shown to be better when the stimulus elements are presented in unitized, meaningful, interactive contexts than when they are presented in an isolated form (Bower, 1970; Epstein, Rock, & Zuckerman, 1960 ; and with children, Paris & Mahoney, 1974) .
The purpose of the present studies was to determine whether integration of information occurs when the information is presented partly in the verbal modality and partly in the pictorial modality; in other words, does cross-modality integration occur? Several studies by Loftus (cf. Loftus, 1975) have suggested an interaction between the processing of related information that is presented pictorially and verbally. In these studies, subjects responded to test questions regarding a previously presented complex visual scene (e.g., an automobile accident or classroom disruption). Subjects' responses were affected by the wording of an intervening set of questions that was included between the presentation of the visual scene and the test questions. Sasson (1971) and Sasson and Fraisse (1972) also reported results that suggest that information presented pictorially and verbally does make contact in memory. In the first of these studies, subjects were presented concrete sentences in the original learning phase followed by pictorial or verbal interpolated learning tasks. Performance on a later recall test was facilitated when the information in the interpolated task was related to the original items but was interfered with when the interpolated task was unrelated to the original items. The interference and facilitation effects occurred when the intervening items were pictorial as well as verbal.
The present study is a more specific test of the process of cross-modality integration. The primary difference between the present study and the cross-modality condition of Sasson (1971) is in the relationship between the original items and the interpolated items. In the study by Sasson, each interpolated picture either was an exact pictorial representation of a previously presented sentence (the related item) or was not relevant to a previously presented sentence. In the present study, the related original and intervening items were also in the opposite modality but were not completely redundant with each other. The relevant intervening item was always similar to one of the original items but included some additional information. The redundancy of the related items in the Sasson study essentially facilitated memory by providing subjects with the same semantic information twice. To test the notion of semantic integration in the present study, each intervening item supplemented an original item and required processing of new information.
Subjects were visually presented information about specific scenes in the pictorial and verbal modalities and tested on the extent to which the two types of information were integrated. The procedure involved presenting subjects with slides of pictures and sentences in both a presentation and a test phase. In the presentation phase, subjects viewed a series of slides describing several scenes. Each scene was -described by two slides, a single picture and some time later a 7 sentence (the intervening item), or first a sentence and later a picture (the intervening item). Half of the intervening items were semantically relevant to the originally presented item with which each had been matched, and half of the intervening items were semantically irrelevant. The test items were slides that were in the mode of the initial slide for each scene and either described an integration of the two previous slides related to that scene or repeated the first slide in the set. The task of the subjects was to decide if each test slide was the same as the one they had seen previously.
If semantic integration occurs across modality, then at the time of test subjects should be less able to recognize an original item when a semantically relevant item intervenes than when an irrelevant item in-
ORIGINAL ITEMS INTERVENING ITEMS

TEST ITEMS
PICTURE SET
The car by the -tree had ski-racks on it.
..___.. tervenes. Measures of d' would reflect this change in recognition sensitivity in distinguishing original items from changed test items. As a result of integrating the original items with the semantically relevant intervening items, subjects would later be less able to distinguish the original items from the changed test items. Consequently, lower d' values and lower hit rates are predicted in the relevant intervening-item condition. Subjects would be expected to yield higher d' values and hit rates when semantically irrelevant items intervene.
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 56 undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts. They were run in four groups of 14 subjects each. Each group received a different order of presentation of the items in each phase of the experiment. At the time of selection, subjects were told only that they would be participating in a verbal and pictorial memory experiment.
Materials. The materials were divided into two categories, verbal and pictorial. Each category was composed of 12 basic sets of items, consisting of two presentation items and one test item. In the verbal category, the first item of a set was always a sentence (Si), the intervening item was a picture (semantically relevant picture, RP, or semantically irrelevant picture, IP), and the test item was a sentence. On half of the trials, the test sentence was the same as the originally presented sentence (Si), and on half of the trials, it was the changed version of the original (Sa). Within each verbal set, all of the items except for the irrelevant intervening picture described one particular concrete scene. The first sentence described a general scene. The relevant intervening picture supplemented the sentence by providing an addi-tional detail of the scene. The Sa test sentence incorporated the pictorial detail into the otherwise identical version of Si. An example of a verbal set is presented in Figure 1 . All sentences were constructed using a similar grammatical structure.
Similarly, in the pictorial category the first presentation item was always a picture (Pi), the second item was a relevant sentence (RS) or an irrelevant sentence (IS), and the test item was always a picture. On half of the trials, the test picture was the same as the originally presented picture (Pi), and on half of the trials, it was the changed version of the original (Pa). All pictures were simple line drawings in black and white. The first picture presented a general scene. The relevant intervening sentence described the pictorial scene and additionally highlighted a specific detail of the scene. The highlighted detail was either a new detail in the original pictorial scene or a changed old detail in the scene. The Pa test picture was identical to Pi with the addition of the specific detail incorporated into the picture. An example of a pictorial set is presented in Figure 1 .
In the control condition, the intervening items were six pictures (IP) and six sentences (IS). They were constructed with the same procedure used to generate the relevant items but were semantically irrelevant to the original presentation items. The subject matter presented in the irrelevant items did not overlap with other items.
Design, A diagramatic representation of the experimental design is presented in Table 1 . Each subject was presented with both pictorial and verbal material, semantically relevant and irrelevant intervening items, and both changed and unchanged items. Fourteen subjects were run in each of four conditions of presentation order. Half of the items in each of the verbal and pictorial categories were independently and randomly assigned to the relevant intervening-item condition, and the remaining items were assigned to the irrelevant intervening-item condition. Half of the items in each of these conditions were randomly chosen to be tested with changed test items, and the remaining items were tested with unchanged test items. The order of presentation was randomized for each of four order conditions with the restriction that no more than three sentences or three pictures be presented sequentially.
Procedure. Subjects were presented a sequence of slides including 24 original presentation items, followed immediately by 24 intervening items, a delay task, and then 24 test items. The delay task was a 3-min Peterson and Peterson (1959) counting task in which subjects counted backward by threes from randomly designated numbers and wrote the number sequences on a sheet of paper.
Subjects were instructed to try to comprehend the meaning of each of the 48 items in the presentation phase, as this would be important in a later part of the experiment. The subjects were not informed that the continuous sequence of 48 presentation slides included 24 original items and 24 intervening items. In the recognition test, the subjects had to classify each slide as "old," that is, one that they had seen before, or "new," and check their response on the protocol sheet provided. In addition, subjects were asked to rate Note, PI = 1st picture presented; Si = 1st sentence presented; P 2 = changed version of original picture; 82 = changed version of original sentence; RS = relevant sentence; RP = relevant picture; IS = irrelevant sentence; IP = irrelevant picture.
their confidence in making each response on a scale from 1 (very certain) to 5 (practically guessing). The slides were presented by a Kodak Carousel slide projector with a shutter attachment regulated by a millisecond timer. During the presentation phase, slides were exposed for 3 sec with a 2.5-sec interval between slides when the shutter was closed. The test slides were exposed for 3 sec, with 6 sec between slides to allow subjects to respond.
Experimental hypotheses. The pattern of results predicted by the semantic integration hypothesis is presented in Table 1 . When a relevant intervening item is presented after an original item, it is predicted that the information in the intervening item will become integrated into, and thus alter, the memory of the original item. Consequently, when the test item is the old original item, subjects will not match this item with their altered memory of the original item and will classify the test item as new. Thus, a low hit rate in this condition would be predicted. The new test items that depict the integration of an original item with a relevant intervening item are more likely to match the integrated memory that subjects have stored. These new test items would then be responded to as old, producing a high false-alarm rate in the relevant intervening-item conditions.
In the irrelevant intervening-item conditions, semantic integration of the original items with intervening items would not be expected. Thus, original test items would be correctly classified as old and changed test items would be classified as new. The above pattern of results would also be reflected in d' values. In the relevant interveningitem condition, the predicted lower hit rates would consequently result in lower d' values. When the intervening items are irrelevant, higher d' values as well as higher hit rates are predicted.
Results
The data were scored in several ways. The dependent variables were accuracy, accuracy adjusted for confidence, confidence ratings, and signal detection measures. The signal detection analysis was included because the conditions of the experiment suggested that response bias as well as sensitivity might affect the accuracy data. Because the signal detection analysis was particularly revealing, attention will be focused primarily on these results. The accuracy and confidence rating data were consistent with the data presented.
Signal detection data. The dependent variables in the signal detection analysis were the d' scores, the mean probability of a hit, that is, P("old"/old), and the mean probability of a false alarm, P("old"/new). The means of these values are presented in Table 2 . The analysis of d' values will be presented first, as this measure is relevant to the hypotheses being considered. The values of d' reflect -subjects' recognition sensitivity in distinguishing the original items from the changed test items. The rejection region for all of the following analyses is p < .05. A comparison of the obtained d' data with the predicted outcomes reveals a generally consistent pattern. The d' values were higher when an irrelevant item intervened than when a relevant item intervened, (d' = 2.83 and 2.28, respectively), F(l, 55) = 6.08, MS e = 2.86. The interaction of modality with type of intervening item did not approach significance, revealing that the effect of type of intervening item on d' values was consistent for both pictures and sentences. The main effect of modality on d' was not significant.
An analysis of variance was carried out on the hit and false-alarm data. Although this analysis is somewhat redundant with the analysis of d' values, it is presented because these data separate out the effects of type of test. The analysis of the hit-rate data resulted in two significant effects. The type of intervening item was significant, F(l, 55) = 12.62, MS e = .04, in the direction that the hit rate when irrelevant items intervened was significantly higher than when relevant items intervened (.80 and .71, respectively). Also, the hit rate for pictures was significantly greater than that for sentences (.84 and .67, respectively), F(l, 55) = 28.02, MS e = .06. No interactions were significant on the basis of probability-of-ahit data.
Applying the same analysis to the probability-of-a-false-alarm data resulted in a significantly higher false-alarm rate to pictures (.39) than to sentences (.18), F(l, 55) = 34.38, MS e = .069. No other effects were significant on false-alarm rate data.
A comparison of the obtained probabilityof-a-hit and probability-of-a-false-alarm data with the predicted outcomes presented in Table 1 reveals a generally consistent pattern. In the pictorial mode, the hit rate was higher when an irrelevant item intervened than when a relevant item intervened (.90 vs. .78). Also, the false-alarm rate was greater when a relevant item intervened than when an irrelevant item intervened (.40 vs. .37). This difference in false-alarm rates was not significant. In the verbal modality, the difference between the comparable hit-rate values was significant in the predicted direction (irrelevant = .70, relevant = .63). The false-alarm rates to sentences did not differ with type of intervening item (irrelevant = .19, relevant = .17).
Discussion
The major purpose of this study was to determine if semantic integration of memory occurs across modalities. If subjects had integrated the original item with the semantically relevant intervening item presented in the opposite modality, then sensitivity in later recognizing the original item would be less than if integration had not taken place. In the absence of integration of the original and the intervening items, the decision as to whether the test item was old or new should be made solely on the basis of memory of either the original item alone or (assuming that modality information is not retained) the intervening item alone. In either case, the type of intervening item would have little effect.
The analysis of the d' data supports the hypothesis that semantic integration does occur between information presented verbally and information present pictorially. The critical main effect of type of intervening item was significant and did not interact with modality. Subjects were less sensitive to changes between the original item and the test item when a relevant item had intervened than when an irrelevant item had intervened. This result supports the integration hypothesis, because each changed test item depicted the integration of an original item and a relevant intervening item. Subjects' memory of the original item was more similar to the actual test item after a relevant intervening item than after an irrelevant item. This change in the mental representation can be described as an integration of the two semantically relevant items that were presented in different modalities. The predicted outcomes were also examined in the hit and false-alarm data. The original predictions were the following: (a) that the probability of a hit would be less when a relevant item intervened than when an irrelevant item intervened, and (b) that the false-alarm rate would be greater when a relevant item intervened than when an irrelevant item intervened. The results of the analyses of variance suggest that the data followed the pattern of these predictions, with differences in the probability of a hit being significant but differences in the probability of a false alarm being nonsignificant.
The absence of a significant effect of intervening items on false-alarm rate was unexpected, but an interpretation exists that is consistent with the integration position. The pattern of the false-alarm rate data as compared with the d' and hit-rate data suggests that although integration of the original and relevant intervening items occurred in memory, at the time of test subjects were not responding solely on the basis of matching each new test stimulus with the corresponding integrated memory. Craik and Lockhart's (1972) model of stimulus processing as a continuum of analyzing operations is relevant here. The false-alarm data suggest that new test items being featureanalyzed were responded to similarly regardless of the type of intervening item previously presented. In the present study, the feature-analyzing process would be expected to operate on the surface structure of the test sentences and the physical properties (e.g., shapes, complexity, contour of lines) of the test pictures. The false-alarm rates, then, were not affected by the prior semantic integration that occurred at a deeper level of processing. This interpretation suggests that the decision as to whether a new stimulus was previously presented was made on the basis of the novelty of the feature-analyzing process of that test stimulus alone. The new stimuli were thus not semantically processed prior to making a decision. The responses to old test items, however, suggest that they were processed at a deeper level prior to making a decision, resulting in semantic comparisons with memory for previous items. The higher false-alarm rate for pictures as compared with sentences seems at this point to be related to the nature of the specific items used in this study, rather than to any characteristics of sentences versus pictures in general. Subjects were more likely to respond "old" to the particular pictures used in this study as compared with sentences.
An alternative explanation of the hit-rate data in Experiment 1 is that in the relevant intervening-item condition, subjects were deciding whether each test item was old or new by comparing the item with their memory of the intervening item only. Two assumptions are necessary to this explanation. First, if each test item was compared with the corresponding intervening item alone, this assumes that the original item was stored in memory independently of the relevant intervening item and that the original item was not recalled at the time of test. Second, since the test items and the relevant intervening items expressed the same information but were always presented in opposite modalities, the alternative explanation assumes that memory for the modality of the relevant intervening item did not endure. To test this alternative explanation a second experiment was carried out, Experiment 2 Experiment 2 was conducted to test the hypothesis that the subjects in Experiment 1 were relying on their memory of the intervening items alone to decide if test items were old or new. The principle difference between the two experiments was that, in Experiment 2, subjects were tested on their ability to independently retain semantic and modality information from sentences and pictures in the absence of relevant intervening items. Subjects in Experiment 2 were presented only irrelevant intervening items and then test items that were either identical to the original items, similar to the originals but with the modality changed, or totally new. The task of the subjects was to classify each test item into one of these three categories on their response sheet. The alternative explanation would be rejected if (a) memory for the original items were high at the time of test or (b) subjects tended to classify modality-changed items as either modality-changed or new.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-eight undergraduate students in psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts served as subjects. They were run in groups of six to eight.
Design and materials. A three-factor design was used with within-subjects variables of modality (pictorial and verbal) and test type (old, modality-changed, and meaning-changed [new] ). The materials were arranged in two separate orders to establish a between-subjects variable of order of presentation. Nineteen subjects were included in each of these two conditions.
The same materials were used as in Experiment 1. In this experiment, however, the 24 items presented in the presentation phase were the Sa and Pa items from each set, rather than the Si and Pi items. The modality-changed test items were then the RS and RP items corresponding to the items in the presentation phase. The meaningchanged items were selected from the set of semantically irrelevant items in the same mode as the corresponding test sentence or picture. The 24 intervening items in this study were 12 sen-tences and 12 pictures, all semantically irrelevant to the presentation and test items.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as that used in Experiment 1 with one exception. In this study, the subjects were instructed to indicate on their response protocol sheet whether each test sentence or picture was identical to a previously presented item (old), semantically similar to a previously presented item but with the modality changed (changed modality), or semantically dissimilar to a previous item (new). Subjects also indicated their confidence in making each decision on a S-point rating scale. The 3-min backwardcounting delay task was again included before the test phase.
Results
The data were scored on the basis of percent accuracy and accuracy adjusted for confidence. Since analyses of these two measures produced essentially the same results, only the percent accuracy data will be discussed. The analysis of variance on these data included the independent variables of modality and type of test. The main effect of modality was significant, F(l, 36) = 12. The alternative hypothesis is specifically tested by considering the data presented in Table 3 , that is, the distribution of subjects' responses to each test type. For each type of test in each modality, the percentage of items classified by subjects as identical, changed-modality, and new was computed. The alternative hypothesis is tested by comparing the percentage of identical versus new erroneous responses to changed-modality test items. With sentences as stimuli, 1.3% of the modality-changed items were classified as identical and 42.1% were classified as new. With pictures, 2.6% of the modality-changed items were classified as identical and 19.1% were classified as new.
Discussion
The present experiment presented a test of an alternative explanation for the hit-rate data in Experiment 1. The alternative explanation was that, in the relevant intervening-item condition, subjects were deciding if each test item were old or new by comparing the item with their memory of the intervening item.
This explanation assumes, first, that each originally presented item is stored in memory separately from the relevant intervening item and is not recalled at the time of test. Data in Experiment 2 refute the validity of this assumption. The mean accuracy for old test items was 90.5%.
The more important assumption in the alternative explanation is that memory for the modality of the intervening items is poor. Since the test items and the intervening items were always in the opposite modality, the test item could only be matched to the relevant intervening item alone if the modality of the intervening item were not stored. The test of this assumption is the direction in which subjects classify modality-changed test items. This direction indicates subjects' memory for the meaning of items, independent of memory for modality. The significant effect of type of test in Experiment 2 is primarily accounted for by the depressed performance of modalitychanged items (67% accuracy). The depressed accuracy of subjects on modalitychanged items was primarily because they erroneously classified these items as new. Subjects were not, then, generally mistaking modality-changed test items for previously seen old items, as the alternative explanation suggests. On the basis of the results of Experiment 2, the alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 1 seems unlikely.
General Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 strengthen the interpretation of Experiment 1 as supporting the notion that semantically relevant information makes contact in memory, despite differences in the modality of presentation. What subjects remembered from the items presented can be described as an integration of the semantic content of the original items with the relevant intervening items. This finding is important because it suggests that information presented pictorially is processed similarly to information presented verbally and, further, that both types of information interact in a common pool of semantic memory.
These results bring into question the existence of the dual-coding system of memory (cf. Paivio & Csapo, 1969) . The dualcoding theory posits that there are two basic coding systems for representing information in memory-the verbal system and the imaginal system. These two memory stores are separate but interactive, with distinctly different representational systems. The results of the present study suggest that at a deeper level of processing, the existence of two separate coding systems is unlikely. The present results are more consistent with a model of memory in which information is stored in one common semantic memory regardless of the modality in which it was presented. Further, these results, along with those reported elsewhere (cf. Perfetti & Garson, 1973; Sachs, 1967) , suggest that once information has been integrated into this common memory, memory for many of the formal aspects of the items presented may not endure.
Heretofore, the large majority of the research on semantic analysis and memory has utilized verbal material as the information modality of interest. The results of this study optimistically suggest that the information presented pictorially is semantically analyzed in a way similar to language and also that the two types of information are stored in a common memory system. These •results are encouraging of future studies in semantic processing of pictorial materials.
